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PART FIVE: A SERIOUS ACCIDENT OCCURS IN THE
MEXICAN PLANT: PROBLEMS OF CORPORATE AND
PRODUCT LIABILITY
MODERATOR: MICHAEL W. GORDON*
PANEL MEMBERS: KEITH HARVEY,**
M.E. OCCHIALINO,***
BORIS KOZOLCHYK,****
IGNACIO GOMEZ PALACIO*****

THE PROBLEM
After several years of successful association between GROWFAST and
AGRICOLAS S.A. de C.V., a serious accident occurred at the AGRICOLAS plant in Monterrey. While transferring Sollate concen trate into
vats for dilution and packaging, supervised by both AGRICOLAS employees and two technicians "on loan" from GROWFAST, an unexplained
explosion occurred. Three supervisory persons and 35 other employees
were killed. Serious injury was caused to dozens of other employees.
The chemical laden smoke from the explosion drifted over parts of
Monterrey and adjacent towns. By the time it had dissipated, it had
caused serious burns to several hundred more people, including a number
of foreigners. The foreigners included two United States citizens vacationing in Mexico. Lawsuits are being considered by Mexicans, the two
United States citizens, and four Europeans.
THE DISCUSSION
Michael Gordon: As an attorney representing some of the potential
plaintiffs, what are your thoughts as to where you would want to bring
your suit?
Keith Harvey: The plaintiffs of course would be the U.S. citizens, the
Mexican workers at the plant and the Europeans. But what about that
poor Mexican corporation AGRICOLAS that was destroyed by that
defective product produced in the United States? I thought they might
be a good plaintiff as well, especially under Texas product liability law
which gives an indemnification provision' for sellers of a defective product.
Gordon: Lic. G6mez-Palacio, would you encourage the Mexican plaintiffs to stay home and sue in Mexico if several of the Mexicans came
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to you in Mexico, or would you encourage them to travel to another
forum?
Ignacio Gdmez-Palacio: First of all, we know that, in a case like this,
American courts would award more compensation, and second, the defendant here is an American corporation. I would advise my client to
sue in the United States. The way American judges think is important.
What law will be applicable is something else. This is a very crucial issue
because generally speaking it is believed that Mexican tort law is a bad
law for the plaintiffs to use because the damages awarded will be rather
small. 2 My experience indicates that the Mexican law applied by an
American judge and a Mexican judge may be entirely different because
the backgrounds of each of the judges are entirely different. For example,
Mexico's law refers to el dafo moral, "moral damages." Mexican law
does 3not allow punitive damages. Formerly, "moral damages" had a
limit. However, by amendment to the Civil Code of the Federal District,
this cap was removed. The judges now feel rather free to impose higher
awards. If a person had $1,000 damages in the hospital, and the person
may have lost an arm, a Mexican judge would feel very generous if they
awarded $5,000. You put this "moral damage" concept in the hands of
an American judge and he may throw everything into the moral damages
and grant an award of half a million dollars. So, the same law may be
applied quite differently in one place than the other.
Gordon: Is there jurisdiction in Texas?
M.E. Occhialino: Yes. GrowFast is incorporated in Delaware, has its
principal administrative offices in Kansas, and has a factory in Texas.
It would be easier to say there was jurisdiction in Texas if GrowFast's
product, Sollate, was actually manufactured in Texas then the cause of
action would arise out acts done in Texas. But Texas follows the principle
of "general jurisdiction." If a corporation that is not incorporated in
Texas does enough activity in Texas, it can be sued in Texas even if4
the lawsuit does not arise out of the things the corporation did in Texas.
So if GrowFast has a relatively large factory producing lots of goods in
Texas, there probably is jurisdiction in the state courts of Texas. What
about the federal courts in Texas? Because federal courts in diversity
actions apply the °personal jurisdiction rules of the state in which they
are sitting, there is personal jurisdiction in federal court in Texas if
personal jurisdiction exists in state court. It would be a choice for the
plaintiff to make between the state court of Texas and the federal court
in Texas.

2. The reference to "Mexican tort law" may be misleading. In Mexico, like other civil law
countries, the law of liability for wrongs is derived from the law of obligations. Chapter V of
Book 4 (De las Obligaciones) of the Civil Code covers "Obligations resulting from wrongful acts"
(De las obligaciones que hacen de los actos ilicitos). Translated in THE MEaicA
W. GORDON (1995).

CIVs.

CODE MICHAEL

3. Codigo Civil para el Distrito Federal art. 1916,[Mexican Civil Code for the Federal District
and Territories] D.O. (1928) [Hereinafter C.C.D.F.], Porrua ed. (1994).
4. Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance LTD. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W. 2d
223 (Tex. 1991).
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Gordon: Would there also be jurisdiction in Kansas or Delaware?
Occhialino: There would be jurisdiction in the state courts of both
Kansas and Delaware, and also in Kansas or Delaware federal courts.
In this fact pattern, then, there are at least six U.S. forums that are
available. The plaintiff's difficult task is to choose the one of those six
places that will lead to the most favorable result. Assuming that all
jurisdictional requirements are met, the plaintiff's attorney would then
ask which of these six different forums would apply law most favorable
to the plaintiffs.
Gordon: If you were assured of having U.S. law applied, it would
certainly seem better as plaintiff's lawyer to choose Delaware if Delaware
had a record of higher punitive damages than Kansas and Texas. If
Kansas or Texas were more likely to apply Mexican law, then you wouldn't
want to go there as the plaintiff.
Occhialino: That's a fair statement, Choosing among the courts of
three American states doesn't necessarily tell us that law will apply or
what American law will apply. Many people think of the United States
as a single entity; one country with one body of law. In fact, each state
has it's own often different body of tort law. In addition each state has
it's own system for choosing whether to apply it's own tort law or that
of another state or country. The latter are found in the states choice of
law principles. Each state can either apply its own law or the law of
another state or a foreign country. This choice of law process is subject
to only the most minimal constitutional restraints under the federal due
process and full faith and credit clauses of the U.S. Constitution.' Plaintiff's attorney would have to do a two-step analysis: (1) choose the body
of substantive tort law most favorable to plaintiffs; (2) choose the court
to sue in (from among those with jurisdiction) that has a choice of law
process that will let the court choose to apply the substantive law the
plaintiff's attorney wants. So, plaintiffs would pick which state to sue
in and, in part, that would depend upon which law that state would
apply. It is not only a question of Mexico versus the United States but
the attorney would also have to be concerned about the substantive laws
of Delaware, Texas and Kansas, as well as each state's choice of law
rules.
Gordon: Nowhere do the facts suggest that AGRICOLAS, is owned
or controlled by GROWFAST. It is a Mexican corporation; it has an
entirely separate board of directors; it is chartered in Mexico; it simply
has a distributorship contract with the GROWFAST company. So how
can we possibly bring suit against GROWFAST? It could be argued that
the accident was caused by AGRICOLAS.
Harvey: I think if you brought the suit in Texas, it would be very
difficult to bring in AGRICOLAS. Even if you did get jurisdiction, you
would have to come up against the policy of forum non conveniens.
Before 1993, 1 think you probably could have gotten jurisdiction over

5. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1.
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AGRICOLAS in Texas because the wrongful death statute of Texas
basically said that if someone, whether a citizen of the United States or
not, has died or undergone a tort anywhere in the world, you could
probably bring a claim against them in Texas.6 In the case of Dow
Chemical v. Castro Alfaro,7 the Supreme Court of Texas in March of
1990 basically said that forum non conveniens did not apply in Texas
and the Texas courts were open to all comers. The state legislature then
adopted a new law. 8 With the new law, I think it would be difficult to
get jurisdiction over the Mexican corporation. However, if I were representing the Mexican corporation, I think I would like to have jurisdiction
in Texas, because I would represent AGRICOLAS against GROWFAST,
the seller of Sollate,TM as another plaintiff.
Boris Kozolchyk: My feeling is that the application of Mexican law
by the U.S. court may prevent a healthy recovery. This is not a case
of strict liability; it is a case of product liability. As far as I know,
there is no cause of action under Mexican law for an injured party to
sue a remote manufacturer or vendor, unless the plaintiff is in privity
of contract with the defendant or can prove the manufacturer's or the
vendor's negli gence. Product liability is a distinctly United States concept
which emerged from the fall of Prosser's famous "citadel" which separated tort and contract law. Despite its continued use, commentators
and courts continue to question it from a conceptual and public policy
standpoint. Mexican law does have a doctrine of strict liability, but not
of product liability. Under Mexico's strict liability, the defendant is
normally the user (whether owner, agent or bailee) of an inherently
dangerous mechanism, instrument, apparatus or substance who, with his
use, injures the plaintiff.9

Strict liability has been used in Mexico predominantly by the victims
of vehicular, industrial or hotel accidents in actions against drivers,
trucking companies or hotel owners.' 0 In these strict liability lawsuits,
defendants can raise the defenses of the victims' fault or inexcusable
negligence, or the occurrence of a fortuitous event or force majeure. 11
The product liability cause of action, then, simply does not fit the Mexican
strict liability mold. Nonetheless, assuming arguendo that it does, the
cause of action on product liability would still have to get over the hurdle
of inadequate compensation by United States standards. The amount
recovered under Mexican law are set forth in workmens compensation

6. TEx. CIv. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1985)
7. Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674,678 (Tex.1990),cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1024, 111

S.Ct. 671, 112 L.Ed. 663 (1991).
§ 71.051 (Vernon 1993).
9. C.C.D.F. art. 1913.
10. See B. Kozolchyk, Mexican Law of Damages for Automobile Accidents, Damages or Res8. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CoDE ANN.

titution, 1 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & Corn. LAW 189, 197 (1982).

11. Id. at 196; See also B. Kozolchyk and M. Ziontz, A Negli gence Action in Mexico: An
Introduction to the Application of Mexican Law in the United States, 7 ARIZ. J. INT'L. & CoMP.
LAW, 1 at 27-30, hereafter Kozolchyk and Ziontz)
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tables for loss of the victim's life or limb. 12The amounts recovered under
these tables are quite low by United States personal injury damage
standards. It is true that Mexican law allows for the recovery of "moral
damages," but judging from Mexican judicial decisions and doctrinal
comments these are also quite modest in nature. 3 Thus, it is my opinion
that a product liability cause of action is unavailable under Mexican law
and that defendant's motion for summary judgment, based upon such
an allegation, would dispose of the complaint before an American court.
If the cause of action were for strict liability, the amount recovered under
Mexican law, including moral damages, would be insignificant by United
States standards.
G6mez-Palacio: It is my understanding of the facts that an explosion
happened in this Mexican company while AGRICOLAS was bottling the
pesticide. I'm not too sure we are talking about what I understand to
be product liability. There are three types of liabilities under Mexico's
Civil Code: (1) contractual liability (2) extra-contractual liability and (3)
objective liability.' 4 Contractual liability arises through breach of obligations under the contract. That clearly is not applicable. But the other
two, extra-contractual and objective liability may be applicable. Extracontractual liability arises due to the performance of an illegal act or
5
an act contra buenos costumbres, "against good customs."' This may
not be applicable in this case, because AGRICOLAS was not engaged
in an illegal act, the company was just bottling this pesticide. Objective
liability arises due to the use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatus or
substances which are dangerous in themselves or by reason of their
velocity, explosive or inflammable nature, strength of the electrical current
they conduct or other analogous causes. This terminology may vary from
state to state and some are broader than others. In any event there was
recognition of objective liability by the legislature as industry began to
develop in this century. Objective liability was recognized because modern
industrial mechanisms created risks of doing injury without fault.
However, in the case of both extra-contractual and objective liability,
the defendant is not liable if the damage occurs as a consequence of the
fault or inexcusable negligence of the victim. 6 Under the facts of this
case, people who were injured -appear to have been outside the factory.
So I believe there would be a cause of action under objective liability.
Dr. Kozolchyk, what would you think about that?
Kozolchyk: I think that the interpretation that would lead to liability
would have to be based upon the per se dangerousness of the vehicle
or the process of manufacture. Translating Article 1913 literally, "When
a person makes use of mechanisms, instruments, apparatuses or substances
dangerous in themselves or by reason of their velocity or the explosive

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 33-35.
Id.
C.C.D.F. art. 1910, 1913.
C.C.D.F. art. 1910.
Id.
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or inflammable nature of the object itself, or by the electric current that
they conduct, they are responsible for the damage which is caused. ..."
The Article seems to be looking to inherently dangerous objects. In that
enumeration, trucks and automobiles have been held to be such inherently
dangerous objects. This may be a basis for claiming liability under these
facts, but my feeling is that if somebody is asked to give testimony
under Mexican law as to whether or not there is in the Mexican law a
doctrine of product liability, where negligence doesn't count, where there
is no assumption of the risk, and where there is no contributory negligence,
a cause of action somewhere between contract and tort, the answer would
have to be no. That kind of a cause of action, per se, does not exist.
We have different interpretations of one of the crucial provisions here,
Article 1913 of the Mexican Civil Code. I read Article 1913 to say that
when a person makes use of dangerous mechanisms or instrumentalities,
that person becomes the target defendant. It would not be because of
a doctrine of product liability. Under Article 1913, it is not the party
who manufactured the dangerous mechanism or instrumentality who may
be liable, but the person who harms someone by making use of it. That's
the way I read it. I believe that Lic. G6mez-Palacio reads Article 1913
more broadly.
G6mez-Palacio: I believe that our difference is limited to the breadth
of meaning to be applied to "dangerous mechanisms, instruments and
substances." I agree that Article 1913 does not extend to the manufacturer
of such "dangerous mechanisms;" it extends only to the person who
makes use of them.
Harvey: I find it intriguing that we have a debate right here among
our Mexican law experts about what is the Mexican law. An American
judge, asked to apply Mexican law, is probably going to be a little bit
disquieted by the thought that it may be difficult to determine what
Mexican law is. If that judge had the alternative, would he probably go
with the good old safe "what the judge knows" law of the forum? I
wonder if we could talk about proof of foreign law in American courts.
G6mez-Palacio: I think conflicting expert opinions will always be possible in an American court. Defendant and plaintiff are going to bring
their own experts. I've been in cases where there have been twenty expert
opinions. Of course it is always difficult to apply foreign law for any
court in the world.
The only area that gets a little closer to product liability is the statute
on consumer protection.1" But I must say that I have signed a legal
opinion saying that in my opinion, a swimming pool is a dangerous
thing that would fall within the doctrine of objective liability. This case
involved a swimming pool at a hotel in Mexico owned by an international
hotel chain. As I mentioned before there are certain state codes that are
more ample, broader, and that is the case of the code of Quintana Roo

17. Ley Federal de Proteccion al Consumidor, [Federal Consumer Protection Law, (D.O. December 24, 1994).
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which was a code that was issued thinking about the tourists in Quintana
Roo.
Gordon: A similar problem occurred in a case on which I worked
with one of our large battery companies. A U.S. court was being asked
to apply Mexican law, and the court wanted to assure itself that there
was a cause of action under Mexican law and a possibility of some
damages being awarded under Mexican law. The court did not want to
recognize that Mexican law applies, and then learn that there's no cause
of action under Mexican law. It's a little bit like the courts not being
willing to remove a case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
unless there is an agreement that jurisdiction will be accepted in the
other area. This occurred in the BhopaP8 case, where one of the conditions
of the court was that the company accept the jurisdiction of India. It
is not just a matter of determining the applicable law; the court may
want to know what lies downstream.
Keith Harvey suggested that AGRICOLAS may have a cause of action
against GROWFAST. Would you expand on that?
Harvey: GROWFAST, of course, will be the target defendant of the
Americans that were injured, as well as the European and probably the
Mexican citizens because I am sure some American lawyers would try
to recruit them as clients. In thinking about the possible defendants other
than GROWFAST, I considered the independent Mexican company,
AGRICOLAS. But what was AGRICOLAS doing? GROWFAST sent
the product to Mexico. AGRICOLAS then took the product, put it in
vats to dilute it, and then put it in the containers to sell it. Then there
was a mysterious explosion. Who caused this? So I thought that AGRICOLAS too may have a cause of action against GROWFAST because
they have damages to their plant; they may be sued in Mexico or in the
United States. The most logical thing for AGRICOLAS to do is go to
the United States where they could sue GROWFAST under the doctrine
of strict liability or some other causes of action.
Gordon: If we change the facts a little and make the party in Mexico
not AGRICOLAS but a wholly owned subsidiary of GROWFAST, then
we have the opportunity to try the Mexican enterprise under the doctrine
of strict liability.
Harvey: I think you would have a better case all across the board.
Occhialino: Your fact pattern as written is very subtle. It states that
the product blew up during the process of dilution, but it doesn't say
that the product blew up because of any defect in the product as opposed
to the way it was being handled by AGRICOLAS at the time. If improper
handling, rather than a defective product, was the cause, American
concepts of strict product liability might not apply. Product liability law
requires a defect. Possibly the product was fine, but the way it was
handled was not.

18. In Re: Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal India, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y.
1986).
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The facts presented in the problem you have written suggest as well
that there were two GROWFAST employees who were present, but they
were on loan to AGRICOLAS. This would suggest that they might have
been under the control of AGRICOLAS. Therefore, under American law
the manufacturer, GROWFAST, may not be liable for their conduct at
the time.19 This scenario suggests that GROWFAST might not be liable
at all and that only AGRICOLAS would be liable. This would be
disastrous for plaintiffs because: (1) they couldn't sue AGRICOLAS in
the United States anywhere due to the lack of personal jurisdiction; and
(2) according to our panelists, Mexican law may not be very favorable
to them in Mexico.
Gordon: In purely domestic parent-subsidiary cases in the United States
where there is piercing of the corporate veil, there are relatively few
cases where the court doesn't require a finding of some kind of wrongful
conduct on the part of the parent corporation. It's usually where the
parent has used the subsidiary illegally, fraudulently or there is some
other kind of misuse. The great fear, of course, is that somebody is
going to recognize enterprise liability and that suggests that, if you have
a parent and a subsidiary, there ought to be unity and there ought to
be liability.
I don't find the courts talking much about enterprise liability in the
United States, the area where I do most of my consulting work for large
U.S. corporations, and we've never had that raised, by opposing counsel.
The defendant corporation doesn't want to raise enterprise liability, of
course, and then have to defend against it. Yet we are beginning to hear
enterprise liability referred to in the multinational enterprise context. Do
you think we are likely to see a development of that in the transnational
context?
Harvey: In Texas, the corporate entity is respected and piercing the
corporate veil is very difficult. However, in tort cases there has been a
little movement in that direction, e.g., in the Hornsby case 2° and the
Western Horizontal Drilling Corporation case. 2 These cases deal with
different approaches to finding individuals liable either for their own
negligence or by the way their business is structured through the piercing
of the corporate veil by way of the alter ego theory. The facts of the
case before us lend themselves to another common law theory used by
courts in Texas to pierce the corporate veil namely, the single business

19. See, E.g., 53 AM. JUR.2d Master and Servant § 415 (1970) (loaner servant doctrine).

20. Leitch v. Hornsby 855 S.W.2d 243, 252 (Tex.App. 1994) (The appeals court upheld a jury's
finding of an officer and agent's personal liability for their own negligence. The piercing of the
corporate veil was deemed not necessary unless the individual's negligence is merely derivative of
the corporation's negligence).
21. In Western Horizontal Drilling Corporation v. Jonnet Energy Corp., 11 F.3d 65, 66 (5th
Cir. 1994) the Court referred to the Texas Supreme Court decision in Castleberry v. Branscum,
721 S.W. 2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1986) (Which defined the concept of alter ego as when "a corporation
is organized and operated as a mere tool or business conduit of another corporation").
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enterprise theory.2 2 Under this theory, one business can be made liable
for the debts (and I would extend that principle to include tortious or
negligent acts) of another.
Gordon: We find the same thing with experts in the U.S. I was asked
to respond in a case where there were two plaintiffs' and two defendants'
expert affidavits with regard to whether punitive damages are permissible
because the law doesn't say anything about them. Two lawyers had said
they were totally inconsistent with civil law and the other two lawyers
had said since they are not expressly excluded in the civil code, therefore
it would be in the power of the court to grant punitive damages. I agreed
with the first and went back into some of the history of the development
of punitive damages, and the court agreed with that side. But it certainly
isn't surprising that we get very, very different views on the law.
Allan Van Fleet: If this were a consignment arrangement where the
title was held by the party in the United States, GrowFast, and title
didn't pass until the buyer, AGRICOLAS, purchased the explosive substances, wouldn't there be liability on the part of GROWFAST under the
Mexican code, Article 1932(I)? Article 1932(1) says, "the proprietors shall
equally be responsible for damage caused: (I) By the explosion of machines
,,23
or by the combustion of explosive substances; ....

Gordon: It happened in a building.
Kozolchyk: I believe that the provision in Article 1932 refers back to
Article 1931, which concerns the responsibilities of owners of a building. 24
They're not talking about other ownership of the movable property or
personalty, the explosive substances.
Gordon: The provision of Article 1929 refers to responsibility of owners
of animals,2 so I'm not so sure that there is a reference in 1932 to
1931.
Kozolchyk: But 1929 refers specifically to the "owner of an animal,"
(el duero de un animal) unlike the reference to "the proprietors" (los
proprietarios)in Article 1932.
John Stephenson: Let me change the facts a little bit. What if GROWFAST sells these products to AGRICOLAS by selling them, FOB, from

22. The single business enterprise theory was defined in Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Taylor
Rental Center, 712 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App. 1986) as ". .when corporations are not operated
as separate entities but rather integrate their resources to achieve a common business purpose, each
constituent corporation may be held liable for debts incurred in pursuit of that business." In
determining whether two or more corporations have not been maintained as separate entities, courts
in Texas have typically considered the following factors: (1) common employees; (2) common offices;
(3) centralized accounting; (4) payment of wages by one corporation to another corporation's
employees; (5) common business name; (6) services rendered by the employees of one corporation
on behalf of another corporation; (7) undocumented transfers of funds between corporations; and
(8) unclear allocation of profits and losses between corporations. See also Superior Derick Services,
Inc. v. Anderson, 831 S.W.2d 868, 875 (Tex. App. 1992); Allright Texas, Inc. v. Simons, 501
S.W.2d 145, 150 (Tex. App. 1973); Murphy Brothers Chevrolet Company, Inc. v. East Oakland
Auto Auction, 437 S.W.2d 272, 275-276 (Tex. App. 1969).
23. C.C.D.F. art. 1932.
24. C.C.D.F. art. 1931.
25. C.C.D.F. art. 1929.

U.S. -MEXICO

LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.

4

the factory in either Texas or some other U.S. location, so that GROWFAST has no connection to Mexico, other than selling products in the
United States to a distributor from Mexico. Suppose the distribution
agreement requires title to transfer in the United States. Does that affect
the results?
Occhialino: From my perspective, the answer wouldn't be different so
long as there was a defect in the product as it left the manufacturer's
hands in the United States. I think a Texas Court would apply Texas
strict products liability, if the product was manufactured in Texas. On
the other hand, if the problem is not a defect created by the manufacturer,
but by the way the product was handled by the Mexican company in
Mexico, there may be no substantive liability under American law. A
person is not liable for the negligence of an independent distributor. The
corporate setup under which the product was distributed then could make
a significant difference.
Gordon: Would your view change if GROWFAST had no idea who
the purchaser was or where the goods would be taken?
Occhialino: That would be important for purposes of personal jurisdiction if a Mexican court were trying to assert jurisdiction and GROWFAST opposed Mexico's jurisdiction by saying, it didn't know the product
would end up there. I don't think it would affect a Texas court's choice
of law. I do think it would affect a Mexican court's jurisdiction if Mexico
has jurisdiction principles like the U.S. that focus on foreseeability that
you might be sued in the forum.
Gordon: Whose choice of law rules will be applied by a court in the
U.S.? Whose choice of law rules will be applied by a court in Mexico?
Could we look for a moment at the source of this law?
Occhialino: In the United States all fifty states are free, within the
bounds of the constitutional provisions of full faith and credit and due
26
process, to choose the choice of law system that they would prefer.
There are two basic choice of law systems: traditional, as reflected in
the First Restatement, 21 which is very rule-oriented; and the Second
Restatement,u which requires a more "significant relationship" or "contacts approach." Every American state is free to use either one of those
systems or any of the many variations of these two that also exist. There
are professors who become famous by getting their name on a slight
variation of one of the two basic choice of law systems. There is no
single choice of law system that must be applied in each state in the
United States. There could have been, I suppose, but the United States
Supreme Court held that, when a federal court is sitting as a diversity
jurisdiction court, instead of having a single federal system of choice of
law to apply the federal courts are bound to follow the choice of law
system of the state in which the federal court sits. 29 So even if you file

26. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
27. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
29. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. MFS. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
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a product liability claim in a federal court, you don't get a single federal
choice of law principle applied by all federal courts. A federal court in
Delaware applies state of Delaware principles of choice of law, and a
Texas federal court applies state of Texas principles. The big challenge
for an American lawyer trying to choose a forum is to find a forum
that: (1) has jurisdiction, and (2) has a choice of law system that will
point to the product liability law most favorable to the plaintiffs.
Gordon: Would a Texas court have recognized a contractual provision
that Texas law ought to apply in the sales of these products to AGRICOLAS?
Occhialino: That is a difficult question because in our hypothetical
bystanders are suing rather than parties to the contract itself. I'm not
sure that a choice of law clause in a contract between GROWFAST and
AGRICOLAS would be relevant to a personal injury action by third
persons who aren't parties to that contract.
Gordon: What if AGRICOLAS itself were suing GROWFAST?
Occhialino: The contractual provision probably would be recognized.
Choice of law clauses in contracts are an antidote to the vague choice
of law systems that operate in the absence of a contractual provision.
The principles of choice of law that are applied in the United States are
so vague and so ambiguous that, absent a choice of law clause, this
very ambiguity means that good lawyering can make a difference. When
one says that the law of the place of the most significant relationship
applies, one has said almost nothing. Then the lawyering begins. It is
the power of lawyers to shape the policies of the different governments
that are involved and the fairness arguments for the parties and then,
after making excellent technical arguments, to touch the judge's sense
of justice. In this case the question really is; "Does a Texas federal
judge want to hurt an American corporation with a large presence in
Texas by choosing an applicable law that will give large damages and
easy rules of liability when for the most part, non-American and nonTexan plaintiffs are suing?" In my view, it probably would come down
to that. But it would take fifty pages of briefing on pure law before
we got to the real issue.
Gordon: If the contract had a provision that Mexican law applied, or
that Texas law applied if the matter went to a Mexican court either
because it was initiated before a Mexican court or after a forum non
conveniens argument, would the Mexican court recognize the choice made
in the contract? And, assuming no choice had been made in the contract,
how would the Mexican court decide? Do they apply a "significant
relationship" principle in determining what law is applicable?
Gdmez-Palacio: I believe we would say that there is no choice of law
situation. If AGRICOLAS bottled the product in the wrong way, there
was an illicit act. There are three distinct principles of liability, and one
of them is contractual liability. There you have a choice of law. But in
objective liability, which is an accident, then you just go to see whether
according to the rules of the code that Mexican law applies. And Article
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12 of the Mexican Civil Code says that Mexican laws are applicable to
all persons who are in the Republic.
David Spencer: I wanted to raise a question about personal jurisdiction.
If I were the lawyer for the U.S. company, or a good plaintiff lawyer,
I would anticipate that the U.S. company is going to raise a cross-claim
against the Mexican company, AGRICOLAS, because the facts say that
the explosion is unexplained. Which of these forums will have personal
jurisdiction over that Mexican company in order to hear that cross-claim?
Occhialino: If AGRICOLAS has done nothing in the United States,
certainly not in Texas or Kansas or Delaware, under American principles
of due process for personal jurisdiction, AGRICOLAS would not be
subject to in personam jurisdiction in any American court. That means
that the plaintiffs would probably pursue their litigation against GROWFAST, get a judgment against GROWFAST, and after the judgment was
paid, GROWFAST perhaps would have to go to Mexico to seek contribution or indemnification either under principles of American or Mexican law or pursuant to the contract they signed in the distribution
agreement. I don't see AGRICOLAS as a party in an American court
unless it waives the defense of lack of personal jurisdiction, 0 or unless
AGRICOLAS itself sues in the United States.
If AGRICOLAS does sue, it would open itself to a compulsory counterclaim. t Then there could be personal jurisdiction and the contribution
or indemnification lawsuit would be permitted against them in an American court. But if AGRICOLAS stays out of the American litigation
entirely, it would not be forced in against its will, due to lack of personal
jurisdiction.
Gordon: Could the matter be transferred out of a Texas court to
Mexico under current statutory forum non conveniens law in Texas with
regard: (1) to the Mexican citizen plaintiffs; (2) with regard to the United
States citizen plaintiffs; and (3) with regard to the European plaintiffs.
Where would they send it? Or would they not really send it to Mexico,
but say this isn't the appropriate forum at least with regard to the
European plaintiffs?
Harvey: Under the Texas forum non conveniens statute, if the only
plaintiffs were Mexicans, I think the claim would be sent back to Mexico.
The forum non conveniens law in Texas is divided in into two parts:
one for residents and another for non-residents, and their standards are
different.32 If the two U.S. citizens are also plaintiffs, I think there would
be a big battle under the forum non conveniens statute. Under the Texas

30. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(1). (The absence of personal jurisdiction may be waived by the
defendant).
31. E.g., Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Il. 1968),
(By filing suit, plaintiff waives objections plaintiff might otherwise have had concerning personal
jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims).
32. TEx. Civ. PRthc. & REM. CooE ANN. § 71.051(a) (Vernon 1993)(With respect to a claimant
who is not a legal resident of the United States). TEx. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b)
(Vernon 1993)(With respect to a claimant who is a legal resident of the United States).
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forum non conveniens law there's a trap, which is that you have to file
a motion to stay or dismiss for forum non conveniens within the same
period you would file a motion to transfer venue. 3 That's the first
Monday after 20 days from being served. So you've got to move very
quickly to get that motion on file, or you waive it and you're there.
The statutory provision governing claimants who are legal residents of
the United States establishes a much higher burden on the defendant to
have the suit dismissed on the grounds of forum non conveniens so 3if4
one of the plaintiffs is a Texan, the case may have to stay in Texas.
Gordon: So, counsel for the plaintiffs should search the countryside
and find one Texan who was injured, and 450 Mexicans would be able
to get the case before a Texas court?
Harvey: The state of Texas has a long history of being an open forum
for anyone who wants to bring a lawsuit, because the plaintiff bar has
been very powerful there and they have made sure they have plenty of
business. The Texas wrongful death statute basically says that if anyone
comes under the wrongful death statute and the country where they are
domiciled has similar provisions and if, in the country where they are,
the statute of limitations has not run to bring a suit, you can bring it
in the state of Texas." There is a tradition in Texas jurisprudence to
make the law as wide as possible so you can bring that cause of action
in Texas.
Occhialino: If I represented any Mexican plaintiff in this case, I would
want to tag along with a plaintiff who was a United States citizen,
preferably a Texan. If there is a Texas plaintiff, the Texas forum non
conveniens provision makes it impossible to dismiss that Texas plaintiff
on forum non conveniens grounds.16 And then I would hope there would
be some principle that they would not dismiss the suit of the non-Texan
and only keep that portion filed by the Texas plaintiff. If I were the
defendant, however, I would engage in a two-step process to undo the
piggy-backing of the non-Texan's claim onto that of a Texan. I would
first move to sever the American citizens from the Mexican nationals.37
I would argue that different laws might apply to the Mexican nationals
under choice of law principles so it doesn't make sense to try them
together with the Texas plaintiffs. Having severed the Mexican nationals,
I now have one case involving a Texan plaintiff and another involving
numerous Mexican nationals. Now I can make an argument based on
forum non conveniens as to the Mexican nationals. By a couple of
procedural quick steps, the defendant could undo the plaintiffs' choice
to bring a Texan along with several Mexican nationals as plaintiffs.
Gordon: Please look at the damage provisions for a minute because
certainly that seems critical as to where you are going to initiate your

33. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.002(b) (Vernon 1995).
34. TEX. CiV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b) (Vernon 1993).
35. TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.031 (Vernon 1985).
36. TEX. CiV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051 (West 1986).

37. TEX. R. Civ. P. 41.
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suit. The plaintiffs' counsel are going to look at Delaware, Kansas, Texas,
and Mexico and find where they are most likely to get a judgment of
the highest possible damages, and then argue that state's law ought to
apply. We are all assuming that Mexican damages aren't going to be
very high, though Lic. G6mez-Palacio suggested that under moral damages
concepts, damages might go as high as a half million dollars for each
plaintiff.3"
G6mez-Palacio: In Mexico, there are two kinds of damages, physical
and moral damages.
Physical damage is an amount based on the Federal Labor Law depending on the damage caused.39 And whatever the Federal Labor Law
states, the amount is multiplied by 4 and you have your physical damage.
For example, Article 480 of the labor law covers total permanent incapacity. Article 479 covers parti;l...
p
incapacity. In the case of
total permanent incapacity, the Federal Labor Law recognizes that you4
have to obtain the "highest minimum daily salary applicable in the area." 0
For example, minimum salary in a given area in Mexico right now is 4
dollars a day. So you multiply that by 4 and that gives you 16 dollars.
And then the Federal Labor Law will recognize for total permanent
incapacity 1,095 days, which you multiply by 16 dollars. As a matter
of fact, it comes out to $16,420 for total permanent incapacity. That is
the physical damages. There used to be a cap on moral damages, which
was two thirds of the physical damages. You would take the $16,420,
plus two thirds for moral damage. The Federal District Code was amended
years ago. The amendment consisted of abolishing a cap for the moral
damages. 4 ' It is open now; the judge can just consider whatever amount
he feels is proper.4 2 What are moral damages? Article 1916 of the Civil
Code covers damage to the feelings, affections, beliefs, appearance, honor,
reputation, private life, physical aspects or the reactions of others to him
or her. 43 It refers to the profession of the injured person and recognizes
the fact that, depending on his or her profession and income, the damages
may be larger in the United States. Now the judge has a free hand
because a price is put upon "honor." Well, how much is it worth? For
example, one testicle, how much will it affect your feelings? Here, the
judge has an absolute free hand with no cap situation. However, due
to our traditions, the Mexican judge who is used to applying a cap for
moral damages is not going to feel that he is as free as an American
judge using this very same standard of moral damages. Punitive damages
are still not applicable in Mexico. If a twelve-year old girl scout with a

38. C.C.D.F. art. 1916.
39. C.C.D.F. art. 1915.
40. Id.
41. The previous version of the C.C.D.F article 1916 capped the moral damages at one third
of the total recovery the limit was removed on December 31, 1982. See C.C.D.F. art. 1916 bis
D.O. (Dec. 31, 1982).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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grade school education suffered total permanent incapacity, what would
a judge in the United States grant for moral damages? Ten or twenty
thousand dollars? A jury would probably award even higher damages in
the United States. The application of the Mexican law in an American
court may be far more favorable to plaintiffs than it is in Mexico.
Gordon: Why did you say initially that the labor law would apply?
I thought the injured parties bringing the civil action were not employees
of GROWFAST or AGRICOLAS?
Gdmez-Palacio: The civil code specifically refers the judge to the Federal
Labor Code." It says, "When damage is caused to persons and results
in death, total or permanent incapacity, partial permanent, total temporary
or partial temporary incapacity, the amount of damages shall be determined according to the provisions established by the Federal Labor
Law." 4' 5 To calculate the appropriate indemnity one should take as a
base four times the "highest minimum daily salary."
Gordon: This is from the Civil Code for the Federal District?
G6mez-Palacio: This is Article 1915.
Gordon: Why would you rely on the Federal District Code if the
accident took place in Monterrey? Why wouldn't you look to the Civil
Code of the State of Nuevo Leon?
G6mez-Palacio: If the accident occurred in Nuevo Leon, one would
rely on the Code of that state. But most of the civil codes follow the
Code of the Federal District.
Gordon: But since the amendments to the Federal District Code, some
states may not have made comparable amendments to the moral damage
provision.
Kozolchyk: The Mexican system of tort compensation is predicated
basically on a public law approach to the problem, not a private law
approach as in the United States. It is as if to say that the business of
the person who has been affected, the victim of the tort, is everybody's
business. The concept is much closer to criminal law in conception than
it is to tort law in conception. And this is why what you have is basically
workmen's compensation tables applied to the accident because it's everybody's problem. It's part of way to resolve a situation in a social
fashion, and that's number one. If you add up what an engineer in
Mexico would have earned over 25-35 years of productive life as an
engineer, it could be two or three million dollars. That is not a consideration under the workmen's compensation table. It seeks the status quo
ante to bring the victim to where he was at the time the accident occurred,
as if the accident had not occurred. That is the rationale behind this
way of compensation. When I first reviewed moral damages under Mexican
law, I reviewed the legislative history. What seemed to have motivated
it at first was basically trying to inject some rationale for libel and
slander into the compensation. This is why they talked about honor.

44. C.C.D.F. art. 1915.
45. Ley Federal de Trabajo (Federal labor Law)[L.F.T.] art. 495 (Avadvade).
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Gordon: It seems to me that it is not yet determined how judges are
going to interpret this authority to impose unlimited damages in the long
run. I feel very uncomfortable in telling people that they absolutely do
not have to worry about any large judgment in Mexico, in view of the
open-ended moral damage provision. It wouldn't surprise me if we do
see larger awards in the future.
Kozolchyk: The last time I looked up "dafios morales" (moral damages)
in Mexico's Semanario Judicialde la Federacion (whose rough equivalent
in the United States would be the Supreme Court Reporter of West's
National Reporter System) at the National Law Center for Inter-American
Free Trade database, Mexican courts were awarding, uniformly, very
small amounts for moral damages.
Gordon: Assuming you are not going to be able to bring this case in
the United States but will have to bring it in Mexico, in what state in
Mexico will you bring it. It could be brought in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon,
where AGRICOLAS has its plant. But could it be brought in the Federal
District and how would you get jurisdiction over GROWFAST there?
G6mez-Palacio: If this accident occurred in Monterrey, I would agree
that the Civil Code of the State of Nuevo Leon would apply unless it
could be considered of a federal nature, in which case, the Civil Code
of the Federal District might apply. For example, accidents occurring on
the ocean beaches are governed by federal law because a strip of land
twenty meters in from the highest tide is federal land. Thus, a swimming
pool which is within twenty meters of the ocean is actually on federal
territory. The principle is that locus regit actum, the place governs the
act.
Gordon: Is that true of international borders? Is a strip of the borders
considered federal territory?
G6mez-Palacio: No. There is a restricted zone for foreign acquisitions,
but the zone is not federal territory.
Gordon: Could you serve the president of GROWFAST who is on his
way to Costa Rica and has landed at the airport in Mexico City or
Monterrey? In other words, can you obtain jurisdiction solely by service
of process?
G6mez-Palacio: This raises the very important problem of notice. If
a Mexican is notified in Mexico of a suit against him in the United
States by one of those companies that goes around serving notices in
the United States (e.g., Corporation Trust Co.), he would not pay any
attention to it if he were sophisticated and knowledgeable in Mexican
law. Under the Mexican Constitution one has to be served in a particular
way by an official of the court before there is valid service and jurisdiction.
That means that when a judgment is to be enforced in Mexico, the court
order is submitted through diplomatic channels to the Mexican Ministry
of Foreign Relations, but the Ministry will not pass the judgment on to
a Mexican court unless service has been properly made in Mexico. If
not, there has been a violation of a Mexican's individual right under the
Constitution. So the full trial has to be recommenced. If Mexican plaintiffs
were to sue in Mexico and notify the American company I would be
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sure to comply with all the procedures under U.S. law and use an
American lawyer for that purpose, but it doesn't happen the other way
around. Many times the American attorney just serves notice by mail as
in the United States and the service is completely void. I think we have
to use the lawyers in each country to see that we have full compliance
with the law.
Gordon: Assume that there is a judgment in a Mexican court against
a subsidiary of GROWFAST in Mexico; the Mexican court rules on a
theory of enterprise liability that GROWFAST in the United States would
be liable. Would a United States court enforce this judgment?
Harvey: I think the courts in Texas would enforce the judgment because
there is an agreement between Mexico and Texas on the enforcement of
judgments.
Occhialino: Texas has adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act.4 Although American states must recognize the judgments
of other U.S. states under the full faith and credit clause of the United
States Constitution, 47 and the Texas statute incorporates that principle,
the full faith and credit clause of the constitution does not apply when
a foreign country's judgment is brought to the United States for enforcement. The American Constitution does not compel a state to enforce
a Mexican judgment. American judges would first look for a bilateral
treaty or some other kind of agreement between nations to see if the
United States had agreed to enforce judgments of another country. If
it has, an American state court would be obligated under the Supremacy
Clause of the U.S. Constitution to follow the treaty. If there is no such
bilateral agreement between Mexico the United States or even between
Mexico and Texas, 48 each state is free to do what it wants to do, which
always surprises me. It could be an insult to a foreign country for an
American state to decline to enforce their country's judgments if the
state gives as a reason that they're allegedly the product of a barbaric
judicial system or something like that. This could be an embarrassment
to the federal government. Yet, that is the current law. Every state makes
its own foreign policy with regard to foreign judgment enforcement.
Texas is one of about twenty states that have adopted the Uniform
Foreign Country Money-Judgments Act 49 that provides for enforcement
of foreign country judgments for money. The Act contains a few conditions under which the judgment will not be enforced.5 0 Usually the

46. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.001 ET SEQ. (West 1986).
47. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
48. In fact, no such bilateral treaties exist between the United States or any state and Mexico
for the enforcement of the judgments of the other country.
49. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 36.001 ET SEQ. (West 1986); See UNIFORM FOREIGN
MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT (table of jurisdictions adopting the act) 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986).
50. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986)§ 4. Recognition must be

denied if the foreign tribunal lacks a system compatible with the requirements of due process, lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Id. A court has discretion to deny recognition if the foreign judgment
was obtained without fair notice, through fraud, was based on a claim repugnant to the public
policy of the state or if the foreign court obtained jurisdiction contrary to an agreement between
the parties to try the case elsewhere. Id.
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U.S. states will enforce such judgements. I can't think of any reason
why a Mexican judgment in a case like this, assuming the existence of
jurisdiction in Mexico, would not be entitled to recognition in accordance
with this comity standard of Texas.
GROWFAST is not likely to oppose enforcement of the Mexican
judgment in Texas, in any event, GROWFAST is going to write a check
as fast as it can as soon as the Mexican judgment has been entered
because it is likely to be much lower than the judgment of a U.S. court
had plaintiffs sued in the United States.
Gordon: GROWFAST probably would have offered the estimated damages under Mexican law as a settlement before the suit was actually
brought in Mexico or before it was removed to Texas. Often counsel
will calculate the damages in Mexico, and make that as an offer to the
individuals. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognitio n Act has

been adopted now in 30 some states, though with some variations. Some
states have incorporated a reciprocity requirement, which was never the
intention of the drafters of that Act. The United States is not moving
toward adoption of a national law on recognition of foreign judgments.
We are instead negotiating in the Hague for an international convention
on recognition of foreign judgments. It is tied up over questions of
extraordinary jurisdiction. We look upon the French exercise of jurisdiction on the basis of the plaintiff's citizenship as extraordinary and
will not accept that. Many other countries, including Mexico, look upon
the U.S. practice of catch-as-catch-can service of process to gain jurisdiction as extraordinary jurisdiction. Although these issues have not yet
been resolved, I think we will have an international convention ready
for signature in the next few years. I assume Mexico would sign on to
that kind of convention.
Kozolchyk: At the National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade, 51
we have worked on the execution of foreign money judgments with the
Associacin de Presdentes de los Tribunales Superiores Estatales (Association of Chief Justices of State Supreme Courts in Mexico). The
President of this Association, Justice Julio Patino of the Supreme Court
of Veracruz volunteered to draft a model statute for the enforcement of
foreign money judgments based on his experience with German money
judgments enforced in Veracruz.
Other state chief justices pledged their help in enacting similar model
laws. The model statute sets forth a procedure that bypasses in many
significant respects the Departamento de Exhortos y Cartas Rogatorias
(Office of Letters Rogatory and Judicial Requests) of the Mexican Se-

51. The National Law Center for Inter-American Free Trade (NLCIFT) is located at 111 South
Church Ave, Tucson Arizona, 85701-1602, phone 520-622-1200, fax 520-622-0957, http://
www.natlaw.com For a sampling of the research and legislative and trade associa tion proposals
drafted at the NLCIFT see B. Kozolchyk ed, Toward Seamless Borders, Making Free Trade Work
in the Americas, Vol. 1, 1993, hereafter cited as Toward Seamless Borders. For a descrip tion of
the function and methodology of the NLCIFT, see Highways and Byways of NAFTA Commercial
Law.... in this volume.
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cretaria de Relationes Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Relations). Accordingly, the foreign judgment will be forwarded almost automatically
to the appropriate state supreme court. This court would reject execution
of the foreign judgment on specified and limited grounds or forward it
for execution to the appropriate lower court two or three weeks after
its receipt.
The Patino draft has been forwarded to Governor Patricio Chirino's
office for formal presentation to the Veracruz legislature. If those of us
who live in states neighboring Mexico could help enact similar statutes
by our respective states, I believe we could have mutual enforcement of
money judgments across national boundaries very soon.
Mark P. Lang: What I hear from you is that we should tell our clients
that they should get down on their knees and give thanks if they are
sued in Mexico because the award of damages will be so low that the
check will fly in the mail after the judgment and there will never need
be a collection proceeding filed in this country. However, in the event
some enterprising plaintiff's attorney like Mr. Harvey or myself would
get those clients and sue in Texas, we would certainly sue on alternative
counts and claim negligent failure to warn, and even sue the corporate
officers for gross negligence and breach of contract and request a jury
trial, and so on and so forth, negligent failure to properly supervise,
negligent retention of attorneys, alter ego, joint and several liability. So
GROWFAST would be in deep trouble if it were sued in Texas. I know,
I've been there.
If an action were filed in the United States on behalf of the estates
of employees who died in such an accident as hypothesized, counsel for
the estate would first go to the workers compensation carrier and get
$100,000 per death. That workers compensation carrier would then file
a lien in the personal injury action and would have a right to one hundred
percent payback, or it could be negotiated. Is there such a payment from
either the government or a workers compensation carrier in Mexico, in
addition to whatever their personal injury action might be against private
parties, and would the Mexican government have a lien against a judgment
in Texas for those amounts awarded to the injured or killed workers?
G6mez-Palacio: Instead of an insurance carrier, the employer in Mexico
is registered in the social security system and actually pays dues to the
social security on a monthly basis per worker. The idea is that the
employee is covered by the social security and the employer, by paying
social security is protected from claims by his employees for illness,
accidental injury or death. The social security system may have a claim
(un derecho de repetici6n) under Mexican law against the award.
Lang: Then would that social security administration in Mexico, in a
mass disaster situation such as this, have the right to bring an action
against negligent third parties, such as the corporation in Texas or even
another corporation in Mexico, for reimbursement of those monies they
had to pay out due to that third party's negligence?
Kozolchyk: I have seen such lawsuits in the United States on various
instances involving recoupment subrogation, and in addition to that for
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recovery of sums that the social security has paid for hospitalization
which need not have been done, where people have been brought to the
United States to very expensive hospitals and things of this nature. Yes,
I've seen them done in the United States.
Trujillo: It is my understanding that U.S. courts and particularly federal
courts are fairly deferential to litigation that has commenced in a foreign
jurisdiction. Would it be possible for the U.S. corporation, feeling the
threat of litigation in the United States, to commence litigation in Mexico,
and by that means divert jurisdiction to Mexico?
Occhialino: Although it is unlikely to be successful, there is such a
mechanism in the United States. At least theoretically, GROWFAST might
choose not to be the defendant but to become the plaintiff by filing a
declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration of non-liability before
the injured persons sue GROWFAST. Declaratory judgments are available
in most states 52 and in the federal courts.53 The corporation would seek
a declaration of non-liability to whomever it is that they have hurt. In
that way GROWFAST would be able to pick the time, the place, and
if they do it right, also pick the law that will be applicable by picking
the right place in which to file the declaratory judgment action. However
several American cases have ruled that it is improper to use the declaratory
judgment act if the party filing the action is really a potential personal
injury defendant who is likely to be sued soon, and who is merely trying
to turn itself into a plaintiff.14 So in theory there is an American device.
In practice the cases are not very favorably disposed to the use of the
device in these circumstances. I do not know whether such a procedure
is recognized in Mexico.
Lang: Could a prospective Mexican defendant sue in Mexico in order
to establish jurisdiction in Mexico when he has injured an American
corporation by defrauding it? Assume that the Mexican party begins a
lawsuit in Mexico under some pretense in order to prevent the U.S.
corporation from establishing jurisdiction over this defendant to claim
treble damages or some other type of compensation that is available in
the U.S. I think many of the federal courts and even the state courts,
would be deferential to the suit that has begun in Mexico already. I
think it's possible for a Mexican defendant to do that.
Harvey: In Texas, a plea of abatement is permitted by which an action
in the courts of Texas may be delayed or stopped until a pending action
in another jurisdiction has been resolved. If a procedure exists in Mexico
for somebody who would be a defendant to actually become a plaintiff,
such a person might be able to file a plea of abatement in Texas on
the ground that there is a pending proceeding in Mexico, and everything
else ought to stop. This might prevent people from using the American
courts with very favorable choice of law principles.
52. E.g., TEX. CIv. PR.ac. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.001. (West 1986).
53. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (West 1994).

54. E.g., Crown Cork Seal Co. Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 779 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.Pa. 1991); FritoLay, Inc. v. Dent, 373 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
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Is there any way in Mexico for GROWFAST to start a suit immediately,
asking a Mexican court to declare that it is not GROWFAST's fault?
G6mez-Palacio: I must confess ignorance there. I think it is a matter
of procedural law and I'm not familiar. I would establish a big doubt,
though.
Alvin Garcia: What about res judicata and collateral estoppel? Would
a judgment in Mexico, preclude litigation by the same parties in the
United States? Would a judgment from the United States stop litigation
in Mexico?
Occhialino: Let me rephrase your question: If there were a Mexican
judgment and it made certain findings and there was subsequent American
litigation, would the findings of the Mexican court be binding so that
re-litigation would not be permitted in the American court? That question
would normally be answered affirmatively under constitutional principles
requiring one of giving full faith and credit to the judgments of another
state, but since Mexico, rather than a state, is the first forum, full faith
and credit is not required; at best it would be a question of comity.
And under comity principles, an American court could either say the
Mexican court has already found "X" to be true so we don't have to
re-litigate it, or it could choose not to. So there is a lot more deference
in an American court to not give collateral estoppel or res judicata impact
to a foreign country judgment.
I don't know how a Mexican court would deal with the question of
an earlier American judgment.

